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Cal.

ration of their discretion in the choice of
penalty was limited or qualified in any way
by some general introductory remarks spoken 33 instructions earlier.
Two separate juries have heard the evidence and called for the extreme penalty in

this case. We reversed before (66 Cal.2d
524, 58 Cal.Rptr. 332, 426 P.2d 9(0) because of asserted prejudicial misconduct of
the prosecutor. Now the majority seize
upon one word in one instruction to reverse as to penalty a second time. The result is a heavy burden upon the expeditious
administration of criminal justice. I am
persuaded there is wholly inadequate justification under the "miscarriage of justice"
clause of the Constitution (Cal.Canst., art.
VI, § 13) to require yet another penalty

trial.
I would affirm the judgment.

McCOMB and BURKE,
Rehearing denied;

JJ.,

pealed. The Supreme Court, Traynor, C.
held that although law finn's records
indicated that first attorney and second attorney regarded client as a client of first
attorney only, in view of lack of evidence
that either of attorneys ever informed client that first attorney was not representing
the client as a member of firm, and in
view of fact that the two attorneys held
themselves out to public and to client as
partners, second attorney, as a partner of
first attorney, was liable for loss sustained
by client when first attorney misappropriated funds entrusted to him by client.
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
Opinion, CaI.App., 78 Cal.Rptr. 569,
vacated.

J.,

I. Banks and BankIng *"130(3)

concur.

McCOMB,

J.,

dis-

senting.

i

o , ~m"":::'"::.:::"-::m::'::,""
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Thomas L. BLACKMON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Louis H. HALE at al., Defendants
and Respondents.

L. A. 29674.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Jan. 15, 1970.

Action by client against his attorney,
former members of attorney's finn who
were cotrustees of finn trust account and
bank in which· trust account was maintained to recover funds allegedly misappropriated by client's attorney. The Superior
Court, Los Angeles County, Harold F. Collins, J., rendered judgment in favor of client and against client's attorney and rendered judgment adverse to client with respect to all other defendants. Client ap-

Although cashier's check given by client to attorney was made payable to order
of trust account containing names of attorney and his partner, and bank deposited
check in trust account containing names of
those two attorneys and a third partner,
bank was not liable to client after attorney
misappropriated check proceeds, where destination of check was intended by both
parties to be trust account used by attorney
and by firm of attorney and second partner for deposit of trust monies, and that
account was trust account containing
names of those two attorneys and third
partner. West's Ann.Com.Code, §§ 32043206.
2. Banks and Banking *"130(3)

Although either signature of one of
law partners or signatures 0 f both second
and third law_ partners were required to
withdraw funds from law firm's trust account, absent evidence that stamped endorsement was not authorized to effect a
deposit in trust account, bank which relied
on stamped endorsement in depositing
check was not liable for loss sustained by
client when one of law partners misappropriated check proceeds.
3. Banks and Banking *"130(1)

If a deposit is made in a bank to the
credit of a person as trustee, the bank is
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charged with notice that the funds are received in a fiduciary capacity.
4. Banks and Banking *"130(1)
Bank is not liable for misappropriation
of trust funds by trustee unless the bank
has knowledge, actual or constructive, of
such misappropriation.
5. Banks and Banking _133
Bank is authorized to honor withdrawals from an account on signatures authorized by signature card, which serves as a
contract between depositors and the bank
for handling of the afcount.

6. Banks and BankIng *"130(1)
So long as checks drawn on account
are signed in conformity with signature
card, and absent any knowledge of a misappropriation, the bank is free from liabiBty for honoring a check drawn ill breach
of trust.
7. Banks and Banking *"130(1)
Although bank deposited proceeds of
cashier's check in a trust account with a
name different from that of payee, that act
did not as a matter of law put bank on notice of a possible misappropriation, where
parties intended that check be deposited in
that account.
8. Attorney and CUent *"119
If attorney received client's money
while acting within scope of his apparent
authority or partnership received money in
course of its business, attprney's partner
was jointly and severally liable for losses
sustained by client when attorney misap·
propriated funds. West's Ann.Corp.Code,
§§ 15009, 15014, 15015.
9. Partnership *,,217(1)
Ostensible agency or acts within scope
of partnership business are presumed
where business done by supposed agent, so
far as open to observation of third parties,
is consistent with existence of an agency,
and where the third party was justified in
believing that an agency existed. West's
Ann.Corp.Code, §§ 15009, 15014, 15015.
10. Attorney and CII.nt _119
If attorney was acting only in his indi·
vidual capacity and client knew that he

was acting solely in that capacity, partnership of that attorney and another would
not be liable for losses sustained by client
when attorney misappropriated client's
funds. West's Ann.Corp.Code, §§ 15009,
15014, 15015.
II. Partnership ~160

A person dealing with a partnership
usually is in no position to know of special
agreements between the partners, and thus
cannot be charged with knowledge of such
agreements absent specific notice. West's
Ann.Corp.Code, §§ 15009, 15014, 15015.
12. Attorney and Client _119
In undertaking to clear title to realty
and negotiate purchase of note and mortgage on that property, attorney was practieing law, as affecting question whether
attorney's law partner was liable for losses
sustained by client when attorney misappropriated funds entrusted to him to make
offer to purchase note and mortgage.
13. Attorney and CUent *"119
Although law firm's records indicated
that first attorney and second attorney regarded client as a client of first attorney
only, in view of lack of evidence that either of attorneys ever informed client that
first attorney was not representing the
client as a member of firm, and in view of
fact that the two attorneys held themselves
out to public and to client as partners, second attorney, as a partner of first attorney, was liable for loss sustained by client
when first attorney misappropriated funds
entrusted to him by client. West's Ann.
Corp.Code, § 15009.
14. Trusts _240
A trustee is not strictly liable for
wrongful acts of cotrustee.
Trusts _240
A trustee must exercise reasonable supervision over conduct of a cotrustee in relation to the trust. West's Ann.Civ.Code,
§ 2239.
I~.

16. Trusts *"240
A trustee may render himself liable
for losses resulting from misappropriation
of funds by cotrustee by negligent inatten-
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tion to -his duties and by delinquency there.
in far short of active participation in con~
version of funds.

17. Trusts *"262

A fiduciary who surrenders assets to

two partners in withdrawal of money was
not liable as a cotrustee, for loss sustained
by client when one of his partners misappropriated funds. West's Ann.Civ.Code, §
2239.

exclusive possession or control of a cofiduciary has an impressive burden of explana-

tion if he is to avoid liability for misconduct on part of cofiduciary.

lB. Altorney and Client _119

Although first law pa~tner made some
inquiry about money at time he signed
check drawn on law firm's trust account

'.

and payable to order of account controlled
by second partner, absent evidence of first
partner's reason for making funds available to second partner, first partner, as a
£otrustee of funds deposited in trust ac-

count, was liable for loss sustained by client as a result of second partner's misappropriation of funds. West's Ann.Civ.
Code, § 2239.
19. Trusts *,,2B9

Trustees are under an obligation to
render to beneficiaries a full account of all
their dealings with the trust property, and
where there has, been a negligent failure to
keep true accounts all presumptions are
against them upon a,settlement.
20. Attorney and Client ¢:::3119

Since law partner gave no explanation
of disposition of client's money in law
finn's' trust account during period when
partner had full power to withdraw funds
from the account, he failed to absolve himself of liability to client.
21. Attorney and Client _119

Attorney who withdrew from law firm
and had his name deleted from firm name
before client entrusted funds to a second
attorney was not liable as a partner of second attorney for loss sustained by client
when second attorney misappropriated
client's funds. West's Ann.Corp.Code, §
15036.
22. Attorney and Client ¢;ol19

Attorney who had no knowledge of deposit of client's funds in law firm's trust
account and did not participate with his

Max Fink and Victor Shrtman, Beverly
Hills, for plaintiff and appellant.
Matthew L. Hatfield, Lancaster, Robert
H. Fabian, Harris B. Taylor, Peter J. Demos, Swanwick, Donnelly & Proudfit,
Donald O. Welton anf! Michael M. Gless,
Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

TRAYNOR, Justice.
Plaintiff Blackmon appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants Hale, Lee,
United California Bank, and Bank of
America entered in an action to recover
$23,500 plus interest. He sought to recover
this sum from defendants on the ground
that each of them was liable for the failure
of defendant Adams to repay plaintiff
$23,500 that plaintiff entrusted to Adams.
A. default judgment against Adams is not
involved in this appeal.
In July 1961 James C. Adams, an attorney, undertook to represent plaintiff in the
latter's proposed purchase of a note and
mortgage on real property in Nevada,
owned by H. H. Records. Plaintiff went to
Adams at the suggestion of Records. At
that time Adams practiced law in Lancaster in partnership with defendant Hale under the name of Adams and Hale. The
two attorneys had been partners since 1952.
From November 1958 to May 1961 they
had a third partner, defendant Lee, and
during that period the three practiced law
under the name of Adams, Hale, and Lee.
On May 31, 1961, Lee withdrew from the
firm. Adams and Hale continued the
practice under the name Adams and Hale
until they dissolved the firm on August 31,
1961.
About the middle of July 1961 Adams
told plaintiff that funds would be needed
to make an offer for the Nevada note and
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mortgage. Plainti ff testified that he told
Adams that he would put up the money,
but he wanted the money placed in a trust
account so that it would be available when
needed. If the offer was not accepted, the
money was to be returned. Adams instructed plaintiff to make a check payable
to Adams and Hale Trust Account and
said "in this manner that he could offer
this money to these people and it would be
available." On August 17" plaintiff purchased a cashier's check for $24,500 from
the Bank of America, payable to the order
of Adams and Hale Trust Account and
mailed the check to Adams. On August 18
Adams endorsed the check "Adams and
Hale Trust Account by J. C. Adams." Below that endorsement was rubber stamped
"Pay to the order of California Bank; Adams, Hale and Lee Trust Account." The
check was deposited in the Adams, Hale,
and Lee Trust Account at the California
Bank in Lancaster.
During the existence of the Adams,
Hale, and Lee partnership the firm maintained a trust account at the California
Bank, which later became the United California Bank, in the name of Adams, Hale,
and Lee Trust Account. Withdrawals
from the account were authorized on the
signature of Hale alone or on the joint signatures of Adams and Lee. After Lee left
the firm on May 31, Adams and Hale continued to use the same account under the
same name for the deposit of trust moneys
and did not open a separate trust account
under the name of Adams and Hale. Before 1958 they had a trust account in the
name of Adams and Hale at the same
branch of the California Bank, but for sev·
eral years that account had been tithe1
dormant or closed.
On August 31 Adams and Hale dissolved
their partnership. On September 6 Adams
asked Hale to sigu a check for $21,386
drawn on the Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust
Account and payable to the J. C. Adams
Trust Account. Hale signed the check and
de1iv'ered it to Adams. Adams used the
check to open a new account at the Security First National Bank under the name of

J. C. Adams Trust Account.

.Over the next
four months he diverted this money to his
own use.
Apparently plaintiff's proposed, Pllrchas~
of the note and mortgage was never carried out, and in due course plaintiff de~
manded the return of his $24,500. In
April 1962 Adams paid plaintiff $1,000,
leaving a balance due of $23,500.

The Banks' ·Liabaily ..
[1] Plaintiff seeks to hold the banks
liable on three theories. He first contends
that the cashier'S check for $24,500 could
lawfully be deposited only in the Adams
and Hale Trust Account. Since the check
was made payable in that name, he urges
that the California Bank is liable to him
for depositing the check in the Adams,
Hale, and Lee Trust Accourit and that the
Bank of America is liable to him for paying the check on the endorsement of the
Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account.. _, .

Plaintiff analogizes the desiguation of
the Adams and Hale Trust Account as the
payee to a restrictive endorsement that
precludes the endorsee from negotiating
the instrument contrary to the restriction.
(See Civ.Code, § 3117; superseded by
Com.Code,

§§ 3204-3206.)

The check,

however, was credited to the precise account for which it was intended at the time
it was drawn. Plaintiff testified that he
wanted the money deposited in ~ trust account where it _would be available when
needed. No specific ~ccount 'was designated until Adams instructed plaintiff to
make the check payable to the Adams and
Hale Trust Account. The destination of the
check was intend~d by both parties, however, to be the trust account used' by Adams and by the firm of Adams and Hale
for the deposit of trust moneyS. That
trust account was the Adams, Hale, and
Lee Trust Account. The incompleteness
and irregularity of the name of the payee
was inconsequential, for the check rea!=hed
its intended destination. Plaintiff was not
injured by the deposit of the funds in the
Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account in:-
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stead of the Adams and Hale Trust Account.

[2] Plaintiff next contends that the
banks are liable for payment of the check
on an ineffective endorsement. He urges
that the signatures of both Adams and
Hale Wefe required. The check was endorsed Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account, the account for which the money
was intended. It was also endorsed Adams
and Hale Trust Account, by]. C. Adams.
Although either Hale's signature or the
signatures of both Adams and Lee wefe
required to withdraw funds from the Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account, there is
no evidence that the stamped endorsement
was not authorized to effect a deposit in
the trust account. The banks are not liable

for carrying out the intention of plaintiff
and Adams by relying on the stamped endorsement in depositing the check.1
Plaintiff finally contends that the California Bank had constructive notice of a
possible misappropriation of trust funds

when the proceeds of the cashier's check
were deposited in an account with a name
different from that of the payee, and that
therefore the bank should have required
the signatures of all the trustees of the
Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account be.
fore allowing withdrawal of money from
that account.

[3-7] If a deposit is made in a bank to
the credit of a person as trustee, the bank
is charged with notice that the funds are
received in a fiduciary capacity. (United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. First
Nat. Bank (1912) 18 Cal.App. 437, 440, 123
P. 352; Keeney v. Bank of Italy (1917) 33
Cal.App. 515, 51S-519, 165 P. 735.) The
bank is not liable for the misappropriation
of trust funds by the trustee, however, unless the bank has knowledge, actual or
constructive, of such misappropr1atIon.
(Lynch v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union
Trust Co. (\931) 114 Cal.App. 565, 572I. Plaintiff objects to the trial court's finding that the cashier's check was a bearer
instrument that needed no endorsement.
Since we have determined that the check

573, 300 P. 74; Southern Trust & Commerce Bank v. San Diego Savings Bank
(1922) 60 Cal.App. 215, 219, 212 P. 385.)
Since the bank properly deposited plaintiff's money in the Adams, Hale and Lee
Trust Account, that act did not as a matter
of law put the bank on notice of a possible
misappropriation. The record reveals no
other fact that would give the requisite notice. The bank is authorized to honor
withdrawals from an account on the signatures authorized by the signature card,
which serves as a contract between the depositor and the bank for the handling of
the account. So long as the checks drawn
on the account are signed in conformity
with the signature card, and absent any
knowledge of a misappropriation, the bank
is free from liability for honoring a check
drawn in breach of trust. (Fin. Code, §§
952, 953; Desert Bermuda Properties v.
Union Bank (1969) 265 Cal.App.2d 146,
150-153, 71 Ca1.Rptr. 93.)
The trial court correctly concluded that
plaintiff failed to establish any basis for
imposing liability on either of defendant
banks.

Hale's Liability
At the time Adams recei ved the cashier's
check for $24,500 payable to the Adams
and Hale Trust Account he was practicing
law in partnership with defendant Hale.
Adams deposited the check in the firm's
trust account, and thereafter secured $21,386 from that account by means of a check
signed by Hale. Hale's liability for Adams'
misappropriation of plaintiff's money must
be determined in the context of the two capacities in which Hale acted, namely, as a
partner of Adams and as a cotrustee of the
funds deposited in the trust account.

[8] Hales liability as a partner is governed by th~ Uniform Partnership Act.
(Corp.Code, §§ 15001-15045.) Corporation
Code, section 15014 provides that "The
was properly endorsed, we need not decide whether it was a bearer or an Older instrument.
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partnership is bound to make good the
loss: (a) Where one partner acting within
the scope of his apparent authority receives money or property of a third person
and misapplies it; and (b) Where the
partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of a third person
and the money or property so received is
misapplied by any partner while it is in the
custody of the partnership." Section 15015
provides ,that each partner is jointly ,and
severally liable for everything chargeable
to the partnership under section 15014.
Accordingly, if Adams received plaintiff's
money while acting within the scope of his
apparent authority or the partnership received the money in the course of its business, Hale is jointly and severally liable for
plaintiff's losses.

[9] "Every partner is an agent of the
partnership for the purpose of its business,
and the act of every partner * * * for
apparently carrying on in the usual way
the business of the partnership of which he
is a member binds the partnership."
(Corp.Code, § 15009.) The apparent scope
of the partnership business depends primarily on the conduct of the partnership
and its partners and what they cause third
persons to believe about the authority of
the partners.

Ostensible agency or acts

- within the scope of- the partnership busi-

ness are presumed "where the business
done by the supposed agent, so far as open
to the observation of third parties, is consistent with the existence of an agency,
and wher~, as to the transaction in question, the third party was justified in believing that an agency existed." (County
First N at'l Bank of Santa Cruz v. Coast
Dairies & Land Co. (1941) 46 Cal.App2d
355, 366, 115 P.2d 988, 994; Kamen & Co.
2. Corporations Code, section 15009 pro~
vides, in part: "(1) Every partner is an
agent of the partnership fOr the purpose
of its business, and the act of every partner, including the -execution in the partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business of the partnership of which he
is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner 80 acting has in fact no

v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co. (9th Cir. 1967)
382 F.2d 689, 695.) The partnership will
be relieved from liability for the wrongs of
its partners acting individually when the
third person has knowledge of the fact that
he is dealing with the partner in his individual capacity. (Corp.Code, § 15009.) •
[10,11] In the present case if Adams
was acting only in his individual capacity
and plaintiff knew that he was acting solely in that capacity, the partnership of Adams and Hale and Hale are not liable.
Sound public policy dictates that a partnership must inform those who deal with its
members in the course of the partnership's
business of any special restrictions on a
particular partner's authority. A person
dealing with a partnership usually is in no
position to know of special agreements between the partners, and thus cannot be
charged with knowledge of such agreements absent specific notice. (Williams v.
More (1883) 63 Cal. 50, 51.)
[12] Adams and Hale practiced law in
partnership under the name of Adams and
Hale, Attorneys at Law. The firm did not
conduct any business other than the practice of law. Plaintiff employed Adams to
clear title to certain real property in Nevada and negotiate the purchase of the
note and mortgage on that property. Adams was entrusted with $24,500 needed to
make an offer to purchase the note and
mortgage. In undertaking such responsibilities Adams was practicing law. (See
State Bar of California v. Superior Court
(1929) 207 Cal. 323, 334-335, 278 P. 432;
Nellis v. Massey (1952) 108 Cal.App.2d
724, 728, 239 P.2d 509.)
[13] Although the firm's records indicate that Adams and Hale regarded plainauthority to act for the partnership in
the particular matter, and the person
with whom he is dealing has knowledge
of the fact thnt he has no such authority. * * * ,(4) No act of 8
partner in contravention of a restriction
on authority shall bind the partnership
to persons having knowledge of the restriction."
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tiff as a client of Adams only, there is no
evidence whatever that either Adams or
Hale ever informed plaintiff that Adams
was not representing plaintiff as a member
of the firm. Moreover, Adams and Hale
held themselves out to the public and to
plaintiff as partners. The partnership displayed a sign viewable from the street
reading "Adams and Hale, Attorneys at
Law." Such signs are commonly used by
law firms to indicate a partnership. (See
Fletcher v. Pullen (1889) 70 Md. 205, 213,
16 A. 887, 888.) Plaintiff testified that he
knew that the firm was called Adams and
Hale and that he dealt with Adams in the
firm's offices. Furthermore, Adams instructed plaintiff to make his check payable to the Adams and Hale Trust Ac-

count. In the absence of other evidence
these facts would justify a reasonable man
in believing that he was dealing with a
partnership. (See Bedell v. Morris (1923)
63 Cal.App. 453, 455-456, 218 P. 769;
Crabbe v. Mires (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 456,
459, 246 P .2d 991.)
Hale contends, however, that plaintiff's
own testimony supports the conclusion that
plaintiff did not deal with Adams as a
partner in the firm. Plaintiff testified as
follows:

"THE COURT: Were you a client of
the law firm of Adams and Hale at that
time [at the time plaintiff first met Adam's] ?
"THE WITNESS: No, sir.
"THE COURT: Had you been at any
time within the year 1961 a law client?
"THE WITNESS: No sir.
"THE COURT: Were you at any time
thereafter a law client?
"THE WITNESS: No, sir.
"THE COURT: Of either Adams, Hale
or Lee?
"THE WITNESS: No, sir."
3. It is immaterial in this ease that the
actual misappropriation occurred nfter the
partnership of Adams and Hale was dissolved. Until plaintiff had notice of the

This testimony is inconclusive on the is~
sue whether plaintiff knew he was dealing
only with Adams individually. At most it
reflects lay confusion and uncertainty as to
what constitutes an attorney~client relationship. It does not show that plaintiff
had any awareness of partnership law, let
alone that he meant his transaction to be
kept separate from other partnership business. It is therefore insufficient to establish that Adams did not act within the
scope of hi's apparent authority.3
The trial court also erred in. concluding
that Hale was not liable in his capacity of
cotrustee of plaintiff's money deposited in
the Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account.
The account established by the firm of Adams, Hale, and Lee in compliance with rule'
9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the State Bar (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6076)
was a voluntary trust (Civ.Code, § 2216;
see also Hathaway v. Patterson (1873) 45
Cal. 294, 300; 26 A.L.R.2d 1340, 1342; 7
c.J.S. Attorney and Client § 139, pp. 976-977 and cases cited in note 26), and the
members of the firm became voluntary
trustees of money thereafter placed in that
account.

[14-16] Any action taken by the partners with respect to the money in the account must be considered in the light of
their duties and responsibilities as trustees.
(See 26 A.L.R.2d 1340, 1342.) A trustee is
not strictly liable for the wrongful acts of
a cotrustee. "A trustee is responsible for
the wrongful acts of a co-trustee to which
he consented, or which, by his negligence,
he enabled the latter to commit, but for no
others." (Civ.Code, § 2239.) A trustee
must exercise reasonable supervision over
the conduct of a cotrustee in relation to
the trust. (Bermingham v. Wilcox (1898)
120 Cal. 467, 471-473, 52 P. 822.) He may
render himself liable "by negligent inattention to his duties, by delinquency therein
far short of active participation in the condissolution and consented to a discharge
of the partnership, Hale remained liable
for obligations assumed before dissolution. (Corp.Code, § 15036.)
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version of trust funds by a coguardian."
(Estate of Whitney (1932) 124 Cal.App.
109, 118, 11 P.2d 1107, 1111; see also, Fox
v. Tay (1891) 89 Cal. 339, 348-349, 24 P.
855, 26 P. 897; Gaver v. Early (1923) 191
Cal. 123, 126-127,215 P. 394.)

[17,18] Hale signed a check drawn on
the trust account for $21,386 payable to the
order of J. C. Adams Trust Account. Although Hale made some inquiry about the
money at the time of the transfer, ther~ is
no evidence of his reason for making the
funds available to Adams; nor was plaintiff consulted before the transfer. Adams
could not obtain possession of the money
without the acquiescence of Hale or Lee.
U[A] fiduciary who thus surrenders assets
to the exclusive possession or control of a
cofiduciary has an impressive burden of
explanation if he is to avoid liability for
misconduct on the part of the cofiduciary."
(65 A.L.R.2d 1019, 1092-1093.) Hale has
not met this burden.

[19,20] Apart from the loss of $21,386
misappropriated by Adams, $2,114 of the
$24,SOO that plaintiff transferred to Adams
remains unaccounted for. "Trustees are
* * * under an obligation to render to
beneficiaries a full account of all their
dealings with the trust property. and where
there has been a negligent failure to keep
true accounts all presumptions are against
them upon a settlement." (Estate of McCabe (1950) 98 Ca1.App.2d S03, 50S, 220 P.
2d 614, 616; see also, Purdy v. Johnson
(1917) 174 Cal. 521, S27, 163 P. 893.)
Since Hale gave no explanation of the disposition of the remaining $2,114 of plaintiff's money during the period when Hale
had full power to withdraw funds from the
trust account, he failed to absolve himself
of liability to plaintiff for that amount.

Lee's Liability
[21] Lee withdrew from the law firm
of Adams. Hale, and Lee and his name
was deleted from the firm name on May
31, 1961, before plaintiff entrusted his
463 P.2c1-27V::z

money to Adams. Accordingly, Lee is not
liable as a partner of Adams for the loss of
plaintiff's money. (Corp.Code, § 15036.)
[22] "Lee, however, was also a cotrustee
of the Adams, Hale, and Lee Trust Account, and remained liable for any acts of
his cotrustee that his negligence enabled
the cotrustee to commit. (Civ.Code, §
2239.) Lee, however, had no knowledge
of the deposit and did not participate with
Hale or Adams in the withdrawal of the
money. Accordingly, no negligent acts or
omissions of Lee enabled Adams to misappropriate $21,386 of plaintiff's money.
Lee, like Hale, however, was under a
duty to account for the $2,114 that Hale
did not tum over to Adams (Estate of
McCabe, supra, 98 CaI.App.2d at p. 50S,
220 P.2d 614). Lee has not discharged
that duty. Although he left the partnership on May 31, 1961, the trust account
was not closed until February 2, 1962.
Furthermore, Lee testified that until January 23, 1%2, when he withdrew $84S.79
from the trust account, he realized that he
uwas one of the named persons on the account at the u.c.B. designated as the Adams, Hale and Lee Trust Account." On
retrial Lee may be able to account for the
disposition of the balance of plaintiff's
money and show that, as in the case of the
$21,386 that Hale delivered to Adams, he
was in no way responsible for the loss. In
the absence of such an accounting, however, Lee has not absolved himself of liability for the unaccounted-for balance.
The part of the judgment in favor of defendant banks is affirmed. The part of
the judgment in favor of defendants Hale
and Lee is reversed. Defendant banks
shall recover their costs on appeal from
plaintiff. Plaintiff shall recover from defendants Hale and Lee his costs on the appeal from the part of the judgment in their
favor.

McCOMB,
PETERS,
TOBRINER,
MOSK, BURKE and SULLIVAN, JJ.,
concur.

